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After the fire at Clandon Park in Surrey. Little is left of Giacomo Leoni’s great Marble 
Hall from the 1730s; considered to be his masterpiece and described as one of the great 
rooms of early Georgian England1.
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The upgrading of fire safety in historic buildings 
Abstract 
There is a seemingly continual erosion of our cultural heritage due to fires in 
historic buildings. Some of these fires result in partial loss of the asset, some 
result in total loss – in all cases irreplaceable historic fabric is destroyed. 
Accurate recording for fires in historic buildings is problematic, but such data as 
has been collated indicates that the level of loss is high. One of the key factors in 
achieving robust fire safety in historic buildings is the upgrading of physical fire 
protection measures. It has been suggested that we should assume a fire event is 
probable, and together with a context in which outside help might be some time 
in arriving, such measures are considered crucial in containing the fire and 
raising the alarm as quickly as possible. This article considers passive and active 
fire protection measures, using case study material to provide illustrative 
examples. Where it might be expected that conservation requirements, aiming to 
avoid negative impact to character and significance, might hinder disruptive 
physical interventions to improve fire protection, in fact a great deal can be 
achieved. Such a pragmatic approach is arguably necessary for the safety and 
preservation of built heritage, when the alternative might otherwise be yet 
another burnt-out shell.   
Key words: historic buildings, heritage management, historic building fires, fire 
safety, fire protection measures, passive fire protection, active fire protection. 
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Introduction 
Tangible cultural heritage, defined as ‘physical artefacts produced, maintained and 
transmitted intergenerationally in a society’, and including artistic creations and built 
heritage such as buildings and monuments2, is subject to many risks which impact on its 
continued existence and relevance. Built heritage is at risk from a number of factors, 
including neglect, decay, severe weather and flooding3. Most of these can be mitigated 
with suitable care and repair. Fire however is a particularly aggressive agency, which 
can quickly result in total or near-total loss; accordingly measures to reduce the impact 
of fire are worthy of particular consideration. 
There are two elements of the risk from fire – that to the building itself and that 
to the contents. Although loss of original historic fabric may impact on the building’s 
significance, the structures of the buildings themselves may have some resilience; but 
the contents they contain, be they priceless masterpieces hanging on the walls of 
galleries, or unique cultural artefacts contained within museums, may well have none. 
Whilst we might be able to re-plaster a wall or replace a roof after a fire, important and 
valuable paintings such as the giant 1790s portrait of George III by Sir William 
Beechey, which was at Windsor Castle, or Johann Zoffany’s 1760s painting of the 
Mathew family, which was at Clandon Park (and valued at £4 million4), are lost forever 
following the fires in these buildings. Fire damage, of course, also arises to vulnerable 
items not just by flame, but also to contamination by smoke, heat and fire-fighting 
water. 
Previous research by the author looked at the idea that effective fire safety 
management within the context of a historic building might serve as a counterbalance, 
enabling a reduction in the level of physical measures required to ensure a satisfactory 
level of fire safety5. This reduction was considered to be advantageous, since 
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disturbance to historic fabric (potentially having an impact on historic character) as a 
result of fire safety requirements would be best avoided or kept to a minimum where 
possible. This would avoid potential conflict with the conservation principle of 
minimum intervention, or the requirement (as stated in the latest iteration of the widely 
respected Burra Charter) for ‘a cautious approach of changing as much as necessary but 
as little as possible’6. 
This article looks at what might be possible in terms of the upgrading of fire 
safety measures in historic buildings, including both physical upgrading and associated 
improvements to management systems. Case study material is used from a number of 
buildings where such upgrading has been achieved, including Chatsworth as a main 
case study, and several of the buildings within the remit of Historic Royal Palaces; and 
lessons learnt from significant fires in heritage buildings are considered. The focus is on 
high-rated heritage assets – historic buildings of Grade I or Grade II* designation, 
though most of the principles discussed are generalizable to all historic buildings. 
The research methodology employed a combination of literature review; 
investigation of case studies; and interviews with experts in fire safety in historic 
buildings and the fire and rescue services. The interviews were semi-structured in 
nature, to allow any arising themes to be explored in more detail; and were coded for 
meaning (using thematic coding) to support analysis. 
Rationale 
It should be clearly stated that the principle aim of fire safety in buildings is life 
safety. The laws and regulations related to fire safety; the enforcement of these, and the 
actions of the fire and rescue service all focus on life safety. This is not just for people 
in the building, but particularly important for historic buildings where fire behaviour 
may be unpredictable and structural stability unknown, it is for firefighters as well. 
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This paper doesn’t primarily concern itself with life safety and the legislative 
framework. It is expected that life safety in most high-rated heritage buildings in 
England and Wales is accounted for by the proactive risk assessment process required 
by the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 20057; supplemented in cases where 
there is particular public life risk by the active attention of the fire and rescue services. 
Similar legislation exists in Scotland8 and Northern Ireland9. Where changes are taking 
place there is additional life safety oversight via the Building Regulations. The focus of 
this paper then is the protection of the building itself and what it contains. 
Furthermore, this article does not address the prevention of fire. Avoiding the 
outbreak of fire in the first place is clearly fundamental, but it has been suggested that 
emphasis should be on assuming that fire is probable and efforts should be directed 
towards minimising the consequences and limiting fire spread10.   
   Indeed, there is a continued and regular incidence of destructive fires in 
historic buildings. Significant and well-documented fires include York Minster (1984); 
Hampton Court Palace (1986), Uppark House in West Sussex (1989) and Windsor 
Castle (1992). More recent examples include Glasgow School of Art (2014) and 
Clandon Park in Surrey (2015). In 2017 there has been almost total destruction recorded 
at Kelsale Hall in Suffolk and Parnham House in Dorset. In conservation terms loss of 
historic fabric and artefacts, and sometimes the whole building, is a disaster, and the 
loss of original, authentic fabric in a fire is irretrievable11; what might be produced in its 
place is often largely reconstruction or replication. 
Quantification of the level of loss is problematic, mostly due to the lack of 
heritage-specific data collection for fire incidents. Previous data put together during 
Cost Action C17: Built Heritage Fire Loss to Historic Buildings12; the National Trust13 
and from the (now defunct) Scottish Historic Buildings National Fire Database14; as 
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well as more recent figures for Cambridgeshire, Hampshire and Suffolk15, suggests that 
the level of loss is significant. The latter research also identified the incidence of fire in 
listed buildings as being approximately three times greater than the incidence of fire in 
non-listed buildings16. The scale of loss is deemed to be unacceptable and it has been 
intimated that the number, authenticity and quality of European historic buildings is 
being steadily eroded through the effects of fire17. 
The main case study considered here is pertinent because a good deal has been 
achieved in terms of physical fire safety upgrading in a high-grade historic building; this 
having produced a number of challenges which required changes to be made both in 
what was proposed, and in organisational structure relating to the works and to fire 
safety in general.   
Introduction to main case study 
Background 
Chatsworth, located near Bakewell in Derbyshire, is a substantial Grade I listed 
country house; Grade I listed buildings being of ‘exceptional interest’18 and making up 
only 2.5% of the total of 375,875 buildings on the National Heritage List for England19. 
There are two sections to the main building at Chatsworth - these being the main part of 
the house, constructed in various phases between 1687 and 1707 in a quadrangle 
format; and the north wing, constructed 1820-4220. Extensive alterations were made to 
the main house in parallel to the construction of the north wing. Chatsworth is of 
international fame and attracts a large number of visitors: in excess of 600,000 for 
201621. The building also contains important and extensive collections of furniture, 
artwork and objects22.  
Chatsworth is the seat of the Cavendish family, but is operated by the 
Chatsworth House Trust. The House Trust was set up in 1981 and endowed by the 
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Devonshire family. A registered charity, its principle purpose is the long-term 
preservation of the house, its art collection, garden, woodlands and park for the benefit 
of the public23. The Cavendish family rents accommodation in the house from the Trust 
and is also closely involved in the management of the house and estate.  
A £32.7 million programme of restoration (the Masterplan, phases 1 to 4) has 
been ongoing since the initial planning stages in 2005, and is due to be completed at the 
end of 201724. It is in the context of this project that the physical upgrading of fire 
safety needs to be considered -  the fire safety upgrades were carried out in the course of 
a much larger refurbishment project, which allowed perhaps far more to be achieved 
than might be the case where only fire safety upgrades were to be considered in 
isolation.  
The Design and Access Statement submitted with the original application for 
listed building consent established the rationale for the project primarily as the 
replacement of service infrastructure (the last major refurbishment having been nearly 
50 years previously) and the introduction of fire compartmentation; works to alter 
domestic accommodation and improve the public route through the building being 
carried out concurrently in this context25.  
An ancillary consideration here is the evolution of the building. In the case of 
Chatsworth, historic documents show that there have been continual changes to the 
building, and in particular to its interior layout and detail. This means that not only is 
there sometimes the evidence to support desired changes (perhaps by establishing 
historic antedecents or returning to a previous arrangement), but there is also a 
precedent for actually making changes. At Chatsworth for example, a number of rooms 
sub-divided what was shown by historic plans to have originally been a corridor, 
following alterations by Wyatville (the architect responsible for building work and 
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alterations at Chatsworth in the early 19th century). This was used when seeking 
consent as the rationale to remove the rooms and reinstate the corridor, and the opened-
up space has become a key link in the revised visitor route. The fact that the building 
might continue to evolve is supported by the planning system which considers 
conservation to be a process of managing change26, rather than prohibiting it, and that in 
fact ‘keeping a significant place in use is likely to require continual adaptation and 
change’27.  
A more general consideration in terms of upgrading is related to the type of 
historic building under consideration. Chatsworth, as has been mentioned above, has 
continually evolved, and the building interiors which we see today are both complex 
and ornate. In some ways, this means that any alterations countenanced to improve fire 
safety are much less likely to be apparent than would be the case in an older and 
unaltered building with a similar listing. Examples that springs to mind are Haddon Hall 
and Hardwick Hall in Derbyshire, both also Grade I, which are much 'plainer' in décor 
and simpler in arrangement and where changes would perhaps be more readily obvious.   
Impetus and approval 
The impetus for fire safety upgrading at Chatsworth was the appointment of a 
specialist conservation architect to oversee the Masterplan. Fire safety matters are one 
of the key initial consultations of the architect’s team. In this case, a well-respected 
expert in historic building fire safety was consulted, and produced an initial report and 
proposals concerning compartmentation; and subsequently an exhaustive fire safety 
audit, which covered in detail all aspects of fire safety, including management. These 
documents were used as the basis for the fire safety component of the planning 
applications related to the Masterplan.  
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The importance of the conservation architect cannot be understated: in 
understanding the central importance of fire safety; in appointing a suitably specialist 
and experienced fire safety consultant and, perhaps most importantly of all, in having 
the specific experience of gaining planning consent for Grade I properties. This latter 
point means that what is submitted is based on what is likely to be acceptable and the 
process of gaining consent is likely shorter and faster as a result; at Chatsworth the 
conservation architect was proactive in consulting with the local authority before the 
applications were submitted to discuss the proposals, and the actual applications were 
supported by a clear assessment of the impact on historic fabric and well-reasoned 
justifications28. 
Upgrading of passive fire protection 
The conservation balance 
As with all works within historic buildings, the introduction of, or improvement to, fire 
safety measures is problematic. Changes that are made to the building fabric must be 
balanced against the needs of conservation; these being chiefly to retain historic 
character and avoid the loss of historic fabric. The significance of various elements of 
the fabric requires careful assessment, with earlier or rarer elements less likely to be 
able to be changed than more recent additions. One Design and Access Statement for 
Chatsworth, for example, refers to a dressing room which represents a significant 
survival from the period of the 5th Duke (1748-1811) and his wife Georgiana, where 
most of the architectural detail from that period has been obliterated29 and thus retention 
was very important. In contrast, partition walls that were built in the 1950s, whilst part 
of the story of the development of the building, do not have the same level of 
significance. 
 
10 
 
 
Information 
The first point to be considered is having sufficient information on which to assess 
whether upgrades are necessary and what needs doing. For a building where little or no 
recent fire safety upgrading work has been carried out, historic documents, records and 
plans should be consulted. These might be comprehensive and detailed (as in the case of 
Chatsworth, where there is an extensive archive) or very limited (as is the case for 
Clandon Park, where there is little in the way of a historic record about the building30). 
Any existing fire risk assessments; fire consultant reports; communication from the fire 
and rescue service and so on, should also be consulted. It should be noted that fire risk 
assessments for historic buildings, in addition to considering the risks to life safety, 
should also identify risks to historic fabric and contents; and that the degree of any 
intervention should be appropriate to the level of risk31. 
It is essential to have a full understanding of the existing structure32, and a 
measured and fully-detailed building survey is likely to be required for all but the 
simplest of buildings, since even detailed historical documentation may not be 
complete, and ‘as built’ may not match what is shown on any available plans. It should 
be remembered that buildings such as Hampton Court Palace and Chatsworth have 
complicated layouts, in combination with extensive alterations that have been carried 
out over a long period of time, so a complete survey is likely to be a complex 
undertaking. 
Compartmentation 
Upgrading of passive fire protection measures is one of the most important factors in 
preventing the loss of heritage. If we accept that fires will inevitably continue to occur, 
then preventing or limiting the spread of fire is a key way of reducing the resultant 
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damage and it may of course also be a factor in achieving the required level of life 
safety. The main concern is preventing the spread of fire between the area of origin (the 
seat of the fire) and other areas in the building, and central to this is consideration of 
compartmentation.   
By nature of their construction some old buildings have reasonable inbuilt levels 
of compartmentation as a result of thick solid walls and heavy doors; and in some cases 
this has been deliberately included in the construction. It may also be as the result of the 
building having originally been a defensive structure, so for example the Tower of 
London has a natural level of compartmentation for this reason33. However, this may 
have been subsequently compromised where modern services have been introduced into 
the building (for example plumbing pipework, electric cabling and IT cabling) and 
attention must be paid to sealing the resultant holes against fire. The initial 
compartmentation proposals for Chatsworth for example, noted that in the roof space, 
although considerable work had been carried out previously to sub-divide the space, 
nine areas were identified where holes up to 300mm by 300mm were present as a result 
of the installation of services34. Service penetrations in the compartment walls have 
been cited as a contributory factor in the very rapid fire spread in the fire at Clandon 
Park35. Sealing against fire can be achieved with suitable intumescent products; which 
might include the use of intumescent sealants, collars, pillows and blocks.  
The starting point then is to assess where construction form provides some level 
of existing compartmentation within a building, with a view to using this as the basis for 
providing a sufficient final compartmentation; this method being much simpler than 
introducing compartmentation where there are no existing divisions. 
In some cases it may not be possible to introduce physical walls or doors to 
establish a complete compartment line, and a more innovative solution is required. 
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Good examples of this are provided by Chatsworth. A major compartment line was 
required between the original part of the house and the North Wing. However, it was 
not possible to introduce a new doorset36 here because there was no existing line of 
division. The solution that was arrived at, after discussions between the House Trust, 
the architects, the local authority and Historic England, was the installation of fire 
curtains at this location. A similar solution was adopted on the ground floor of the main 
house, where it was necessary to sub-divide a corridor. Here the introduction of a new 
doorset, which was originally proposed, would have meant disturbing a very fine 
marble floor as well as causing a visual interruption to the view along it, and a half-hour 
rated fire curtain was used instead to provide compartmentation. These fire curtains are 
what might be termed ‘combined solutions’; they represent passive protection once the 
curtains are closed at night, but are necessarily part of a managed space, because human 
intervention is required to actually close the curtains. It is arguable whether this latter 
action, taken in the event of fire, might mean in this circumstance that the fire curtains 
could perhaps be considered as an ‘active’ fire protection measure (this would certainly 
apply in a case where automatic deployment of a fire curtain was linked to the fire 
alarm system). Fire curtains have also been used as part of compartmentation measures 
within the White Tower at the Tower of London37. 
A highly innovative response to a compartmentation problem has been used in 
Windsor Castle, and this can certainly be categorised as an ‘active’ fire protection 
measure.  Here there was a large breach in a compartment line on a grand staircase and 
there was no obvious way to mitigate this. The solution was to use water mist fire 
suppression to create what is effectively a curtain in a fire situation. This was a bespoke 
application and the water mist system was designed and tested by BRE38.  
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In some cases, compartmentation may be required in floors, perhaps where there 
are suitable walls, but the walls don’t line up from storey to storey and a ‘staggered’ 
arrangement is necessary. Such a problem was encountered at Chatsworth and a floor 
upgraded as a fire barrier. It may also be used where there is a high risk of fire from a 
particular activity in combination with an important room above. In such cases, it is 
often much easier to intervene via the floor, rather than disturb the ceiling below.  
Compartmentation within roof spaces is of paramount importance, since any fire 
reaching the roof space has the potential to spread horizontally with devastating effect39. 
Compartmentation therefore should extend from the lowest to the highest level in the 
building; this most likely meaning from the basement to the underside of the roof 
covering. The structure of the roof also needs to be taken into consideration, since any 
elements of the structure lying across the top of compartment walls could carry the fire 
into an adjacent compartment. At Clandon Park, fire was able to spread across the top of 
the compartment walls via the roof structure, from where it spread down into 
neighbouring compartments. In this case there was the added problem of a high fire load 
due to storage in the roof space and the fact that a new roof structure had been laid over 
the old one, without the removal of the former40.  
Traditional roof covering in many larger properties is of lead sheet of 
considerable thickness and in fires this has led to heat build-up internally, contributing 
to the intensity of the fire. During the fire at Hampton Court Palace the roof was 
deliberately vented (with considerable difficulty) which greatly eased conditions in the 
building41. In subsequent re-building works to the roof, heat-activated drop-down 
smoke vent panels were installed to address this problem42. Conventional firefighting 
operations, which might involve breaking into a roof (by removing tiles or slates), to get 
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water onto the fire from above, are also rendered difficult by lead sheet. This was the 
case at Clandon Park; though access to the roof was problematic in this case as well43. 
In some cases where there is a specific risk within a building, such as that which 
might be associated with a plant room, kitchen or server room, consideration could be 
given to enclosing that room with fire protection – in effect creating a small 
compartment to contain any fire at source. However, fire suppression is potentially a 
simpler solution. 
Voids 
A further significant factor is the presence of voids in many old buildings. Fire spread 
within voids, which may be occurring unknown and is very difficult to fire-fight, has 
been reported as being a significant factor in a number of key fires, including Hampton 
Court Palace in 198644; Windsor Castle in 199245; Glasgow School of Art in 201446 and 
Clandon Park in 201547.  
Voids may be vertical in nature and may be the result of phases of construction 
or alterations, or may relate to old flues, ducts or shafts48. Initial fire spread at Clandon 
Park was via a lift shaft; the fire getting into this because of a lack of fire stopping 
above the electrical distribution board cupboard where the fire started, and able to 
spread to each floor of the building by this route49. Voids may also be horizontal in 
nature and at Windsor Castle, fire spread was reportedly assisted by the presence of a 
‘large, uninterrupted, high level ceiling void running the entire length (65 metres) of the 
St. George’s Hall’50. Voids between floors are common; at Chatsworth, some of these 
are reported to be storey-height in size51.  
Attention must therefore be paid to identifying any voids, which may require the 
undertaking of detailed building surveys (as above). Any voids must be effectively fire 
15 
 
stopped, normally with a form of cavity barrier, to prevent fire entry into and 
subsequent spread within these spaces. 
 
Existing openings 
In the context of compartmentation, particular attention must be paid to openings on a 
compartment line; openings may well represent the weakest link in compartmentation. 
Historic openings in walls are commonly much larger than the current doorsets would 
suggest, and may render the improvement of fire performance of a door and door frame 
irrelevant. Compartmentation improvement works at Chatsworth revealed void spaces, 
above, to the side of and below openings52; these spaces often being sizeable 
(anecdotally, there are stories of horses being ridden through the house historically, 
which gives some idea of previous height). Examination of the post-fire scene at 
Clandon Park, where the structural frame is now evident, reveals that the openings 
within the building have arches at the top. However, pre-fire photographs53 show that 
these arches were previously hidden behind door pediments, and that the openings were 
in fact taller than they appeared to be. It is not known whether this directly contributed 
to fire spread, but the point is that the size of the actual opening was larger than that 
suggested by the doorset within the aperture. Any such spaces that are found should be 
suitably fire-stopped so as to preserve the integrity of the compartment. 
Additionally, upgrading of the doorsets themselves may be required and can 
have a positive impact in preventing or delaying fire spread. The level of upgrading 
required can be determined using the matrix developed by English Heritage54; intended 
as an assessment tool so that historic doors can be individually assessed for their 
effectiveness in resisting the passage of fire and smoke. There is a wide range of 
upgrading options. In some cases it may be acceptable to remove the original door (and 
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store it in a suitable environment), substituting it with a door having fire-resisting 
properties, manufactured to look the same as the original. This has the advantage of 
complete reversibility. Alternatively, the door may be treated with intumescent finishes 
or upgraded with the addition of fire-resisting panels. Additionally, doors might be 
fitted with cold smoke and intumescent seals and fitted with self-closing devices. At 
Chatsworth, all relevant doors were upgraded to give half hour fire resistance.  
In the context of gaining approval, it is interesting in the case of Chatsworth that 
new fire doors have in some locations been introduced into previously blank openings, 
in order to subdivide corridors and complete compartment lines. The corridor spaces 
have undeniably changed, but the new doors were designed to match Wyatville’s 
existing doors, and are unnoticeable as a result. Although new features have been 
introduced, the final result is not significantly to the detriment of historic character, and 
in any case, the argument for the changes is compellingly strong, since the end result is 
much improved fire compartmentation. The alternative of not permitting any change to 
occur would be to risk fire spread and the potential loss of everything in the event of a 
fire. 
Wall voids 
Small voids may be present within rooms behind panelling on the walls. This was 
mentioned as a major contributory factor to fire spread in the report on the Windsor 
castle fire55. At Hampton Court Palace, panelling was removed following the fire and 
numerous unknown voids and vents were revealed56. Similar voids may exist behind 
lath and plaster wall finishes, where a stud frame has been used to support the laths. 
Fire-stopping such voids may require the careful removal and subsequent reinstallation 
of panelling; this may not be possible in the case of lath and plaster finishes, and it may 
only be possible to fire stop where access can be gained via a floor.   
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Upgrading of active fire protection 
Detection and alarm 
The extent and quality of the fire detection and alarm system installed in a historic 
building is fundamental in providing the earliest possible warning of a fire. Even where 
fire strategies rely heavily on having managed spaces (for example having a room 
steward in every room), there should be an automatic system of modern design and 
capability, otherwise warning is compromised when the building is closed. Ideally, the 
system should automatically inform a control room manned 24 hours a day: this might 
be either on the premises or remote (third party monitoring at an alarm receiving centre 
when there is no one on site); allowing the fire and rescue service to be immediately 
alerted. A hub-based signalling system, such as Nimbus or Smartwatch, has advantages 
over a telephone system in that subsequent activations of the fire alarm system are 
monitored. Where fire and rescue services do not respond to automatic alarms, a second 
detector activating will be enough to confirm a fire and get a response. The telephone 
system does not allow this; further signals do not get transmitted and the fire and rescue 
service will not respond until someone gets to the site and dials 99957. The timing of 
actual alarm signals within the building should follow an appropriate strategy for the 
particular building; this might involve confirmation procedures before full alarm, and 
may be backed-up with voice alerts. 
Though the exact choice of system should be apposite to the risk in a particular 
building, for a complex building an ‘L1/P1’ system58, which will give the earliest 
possible warning of fire throughout the building, is likely to be required. The choice of 
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system may also be specified to satisfy the requirements of insurers. The system should 
ideally be an addressable system, where each detector has its own unique address and 
this enables the exact location of a fire to be pinpointed quickly. Wireless technology 
could be used to avoid unsightly wires. Tests carried out in Italy attested to both the 
suitability and reliability of wireless systems for use in heritage buildings and 
highlighted that such systems were simpler, less invasive and less disruptive to install, 
with a reduced cost of installation and the possibility of easily modifying the layout to 
suit different operational requirements59. The exact positioning of detector heads may 
be problematic in some cases, though at Chatsworth the successful activation of heads 
in other than the optimum positions was proved using tests with a smoke generating 
machine. 
There is obviously an issue with false activation, but modern detectors, 
particularly multi-sensor detectors, used in appropriate applications are much less prone 
to this, with the technology able to differentiate between actual and false alarms even if 
the physical phenomena are similar. This can be augmented by a ‘double knock’ system 
(where the system is capable of identifying when two sensors activate simultaneously 
within the same zone/area).  
Besides the standard types of single-point heat and smoke detectors, or an 
alternative multi-sensor device, beam detectors and aspirating smoke detectors also 
have useful applications in heritage buildings, particularly where painted or ornately 
plastered ceilings would visually prohibit the use of normal detector heads. A beam 
detector might allow the equipment to be at the top of a wall, instead of on the ceiling, 
and aspirating detection is almost invisible in use. At Hampton Court Palace, where 
smoke detection was required in an area for which conventional detection wasn’t 
visually acceptable, an aspirating tube was placed in the eye of a peacock painted on the 
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ceiling and is thus virtually invisible60. A similar solution has been used at Chatsworth, 
again where there is a fine painted ceiling.  Equipment is required above ceiling level 
for aspirating detection, however, and there needs to be space for this, as well as access 
to it for maintenance. 
Fire suppression 
Fire suppression is a highly-effective way of either completely extinguishing a fire, or at 
least of controlling it and preventing fire spread, and may be particularly important 
where compartmentation is difficult to achieve. Where valuable artefacts might be 
damaged by water from a conventional sprinkler system, the application of a water mist 
system or gas suppression system might be appropriate. The introduction of any such 
systems into historic buildings however is problematic. The end result of having a 
system in place may not be visually obvious: the pipework for water-based systems can 
be hidden above ceilings or below floors for example; and the water distribution heads 
themselves can be recessed and concealed with ceiling plates. However, disruption to 
historic fabric in the installation process is difficult to avoid (in one case where 
localised fire suppression was proposed at Chatsworth, an alternative had to be adopted 
for this reason) and installing heads into some finishes, an ornate plaster ceiling for 
example, may not be acceptable. There is also the relatively high cost of retro-fit 
installation.  
Despite these concerns, there are numerous cases of high-grade heritage 
buildings being protected by suppression systems61, and in particular water mist 
systems. The Schönbrunn Palace near Vienna, for example, is protected with a water 
mist system. This is an important, large, complex and multi-tenanted building, where 
the fire risk and probability of fire spread are both high; and where even a moderately 
small fire would do significant damage to heritage fabric62. 
20 
 
In some cases a water mist system might be the only way to address a specific 
problem. A good example of this at the Grade I listed Banqueting House in London. 
The problem here was how to protect the ‘Rubens ceiling’ (the only surviving in-situ 
ceiling painting by Rubens, which was installed in 163663). The problem was actually 
above the ceiling (below the ceiling the fire risk was managed adequately), where large 
motors which raise and lower the chandeliers are housed in the roof space; such motors 
potentially posing a fire risk. The question was whether fire crews would enter through 
a narrow opening to fight a fire in the roof space, which was thought unlikely; as well as 
what would be the effect of firefighting water on the paintings below. The solution was 
a water mist system to protect the roof space; the relatively high cost of this being 
justified because of the lack of alternatives and the importance of the ceiling. This is a 
pre-action system, with no water being stored above the ceiling64. This is an important 
point, since the escape of stored water from fire systems has the potential to cause a lot 
of damage.  
At Chatsworth there are several suppression systems in place, though these pre-
date the masterplan works. These are used in specific areas, to protect certain high-risk 
activities, for example the paint shop is protected by a sprinkler system. Such localised 
suppression systems are a good solution to protect areas of high risk and a further 
example is the use of small systems to mitigate the fire risk from catering facilities in 
certain of the Historic Royal Palaces.  
Where it is not possible to install fixed fire suppression, perhaps because of 
conservation constraints, the use of stand-alone or portable systems might be considered 
as an alternative. Such water mist systems recently developed for other applications 
could be used in this situation. 
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When planning officers and conservation officers are making decisions 
involving fire safety improvements in listed buildings, there is a requirement to balance 
these improvements against the need to protect whatever contributes to the significance 
of the building. In some cases, where the level of intervention might be deemed to have 
a negative impact on this, the conclusion might be that the particular use proposed 
cannot be accommodated, or that a particular room might not be able to be accessible65.   
Management Aspects of upgrading 
High-grade heritage buildings are found in a wide variety of locations, from urban 
centres (for example Glasgow School of Art and the Tower of London) to rural areas 
(for example Chatsworth and Clandon Park). It would be reasonable to assume that fire 
service response in the event of fire might be quicker in an urban area because of 
geographical proximity and the fact that resources are generally better. However it is 
suggested that irrespective of location, the owners or operators of historic buildings 
should not rely on a fast response. This is due to well-publicised cuts to the fire 
services, in combination with the possibility of a major incident elsewhere drawing 
resources away. For example Chatsworth and Hardwick Hall (also Grade I) are both 
close to the M1, and a serious crash here could very well occupy enough resources to 
delay fire service response to a fire in either property. Perhaps the likelihood of the two 
events occurring simultaneously is low, but the history of building fires is littered with 
unlikely coincidences. Rural areas also tend to have more stations manned by retained 
firefighters, and this could also mean that a response to a fire was slower. The 
requirement then is to be self-sufficient in the early stages of a fire, and this puts into 
context the need for effective active and passive fire protection measures, as outlined 
above, and the management measures to ensure these function as intended.  
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In addition to the actions normally associated with fire safety management, there 
is a need to monitor upgrading works related to fire safety. It is not adequate to specify 
work and then to expect that it is done to the required standard; it would obviously be 
very dangerous to assume that a certain level of compartmentation exists, when in fact it 
doesn’t because of mistakes or poor workmanship. Compartmentation work carried out 
in the first phase of the Masterplan at Chatsworth was later found to be sub-standard, 
with the 2011 fire safety audit noting that some of the work done would not provide an 
effective fire barrier. The work had to subsequently be redone. The audit acknowledged 
the difficulties of trying to continually observe the work of contractors and 
recommended the revision of supervision responsibilities66. In response to this, the 
system now in place is to have a senior member of the Trust’s staff acting in the 
capacity of a ‘clerk of works’, to ensure that work is carried out to the required 
standard. Thus, within the organisation commissioning the upgrading work, there is a 
need for organisational flexibility and the ability to make changes where necessary for 
any subsequent phases. The cost of oversight of works should be factored into the 
overall project budget. Additionally, it should be recognised that the incidence of 
potential problems with works carried out will be reduced by employing contractors 
with direct experience, both in fire protection work and in historic buildings.    
There is also a requirement to record accurately and in detail all of the fire safety 
upgrading work that has been carried out. This is particularly important since a lot of 
the work will be hidden from view on completion. Details are also required for all 
detection, alarm and suppression systems, and a schedule needs to be in place for their 
maintenance and servicing; it would be dangerous to assume that the building is 
protected by smoke detection, for example, when in reality the system hasn’t been 
correctly maintained and fails to activate.   It is suggested that all this documentation is 
23 
 
kept as an electronic record, suitably backed up off site, in particular since linkages 
between various sections are more easily navigable electronically than on paper; so for 
example a floor plan might show the location of installed detection equipment, and link 
to the product details and a service schedule.  
If all the physical measures are as good as they can be in a building (accepting 
the constraints potentially imposed by cost and the availability of funds) the subsequent 
consideration is the human engagement with fire safety. Staff training is vital in this 
regard and such training also needs to be a continuous process, since staff change and 
people simply forget. A good example would be staff training to minimise the 
possibility of any action that might compromise the compartmentation, such as 
propping fire doors open. In one Grade II* building in Derbyshire, the doors were found 
to be propped open by staff at night to increase ventilation in order to control the 
significant damp in the building67.  
There is a need for overall control of all matters relating to fire safety in a high-
grade heritage building, and having the right person in a suitable role is considered 
important. This is recognised in many organisations, the larger of which have a 
dedicated person in the role of, or with a substantial portion of a wider role allocated to, 
fire safety manager (or officer). It is thought that this role is best accomplished ‘in 
house’, rather than by employing the services of consultants, because detailed 
knowledge of sometimes very complicated buildings is required, as well as a working 
relationship with staff. Chatsworth is well-organised and proactive in this regard, and in 
addition to the person referred to above, there is a Head of Operations, whose role 
includes all aspects of fire safety. The cost of employing a person for such a role needs 
to be balanced against the implications of getting this part of operating the building 
wrong, since a serious fire, apart from the damage to heritage, could have significant 
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implications for business continuity. In terms of the asset, this latter aspect is also of 
high importance, since in many cases the upkeep and ongoing viability of the building 
relies on having sufficient income.  
It is not acceptable to carry out fire safety upgrading works and then simply 
stop. Fire safety improvement is a continuous, rolling process, and this is recognised in 
the management strategies of both Chatsworth and Historic Royal Palaces. Technical 
equipment for example is continuously improved by the manufacturers, and better 
solutions become available68. 
Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the importance of the upgrading of physical fire protection measures as 
considered in this paper, it should be emphasised that the key to achieving the optimum 
level of overall fire safety in a historic building is to embrace a holistic approach to fire 
safety, where all aspects of fire risk are considered. This was identified by Bailey in 
199369 and continues to be the ideal target, though the continued incidence of fires in 
heritage buildings suggests that it is not being achieved in all cases.   
The adoption of a proactive strategy of what might be referred to as ‘total fire 
safety management’ is thus advisable.  This necessarily includes several additional key 
areas: preventing the outbreak of fire; having in place suitably well-developed disaster 
management plans (including damage limitation) and keeping comprehensive and up-
to-date documentation relating to fire safety. Strategic planning is required; and 
although there are clearly cost implications in the allocation of management resources 
to fire safety, if there is no building as the result of fire, there is potentially a much 
bigger cost implication in terms of business continuity.  
Many historic buildings, of all types and status, are in a process of change. 
Depending on the scale of these changes, there is great scope for improving passive and 
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active fire protection measures. Whilst risk assessments or fire safety audits may 
identify that certain works are required immediately, it is considered advisable to wait 
until other refurbishment work is carried out to do any substantial fire safety upgrading 
work.  
The priorities for passive protection are to establish compartmentation including 
the investigation of all doors and other openings and the installation of fire stopping at 
all service penetrations. Any voids must be fire-stopped to prevent the ingress of fire. 
Whether or not large-scale changes are taking place, a detailed, measured survey of the 
building is required as the basis for understanding any existing compartmentation, or 
construction elements that might be useful in establishing compartmentation; as well as 
the location of any voids. 
The priorities for active protection are to install an adequate detection and alarm 
system throughout the building, preferably an ‘L1/P1’ system. It is absolutely crucial 
that this system should operate when there is a fire and therefore regular inspection and 
maintenance of the system is fundamental. If the installation is practicable and the 
heritage is of sufficient value to justify it, installation of a fire suppression system 
should be considered. 
Aspects of the fire safety management strategy related to upgrading work, in 
particular oversight of work being carried out, as well as systematic maintenance of 
technical systems, should be reviewed and improved where necessary; and this should 
be an ongoing process, rather than a once-off exercise. All work carried out should be 
carefully documented and the records securely stored and backed up.   
All of the above measures depend on the availability of sufficient funding, since 
all are costly to achieve. In this context, high-grade heritage buildings are normally in a 
relatively good position, with many being run as revenue generating businesses or 
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charities, and thus able to factor in the costs of carrying out upgrading work, and 
allocate management resources, as part of overall business planning. 
Both Chatsworth and the buildings making up the Historic Royal Palaces are 
high-grade assets which can be considered as examples of best practice in terms of fire 
safety. They have been able to achieve considerable improvements in overall fire safety 
by the upgrading of fire protection, and have had the flexibility to embrace bespoke 
solutions. They have also adopted a thorough and holistic approach to fire safety, 
including management aspects. 
When considering fire safety in historic buildings, we are really trying to 
balance the requirements of achieving a sufficient level of life safety and property 
protection on the one hand, with an acceptable level of impact on historic character and 
historic fabric on the other. However, given the sad regularity of devastating fires in 
historic buildings, what exactly is acceptable in conservation terms should perhaps 
involve a good degree of pragmatism, and there is strong argument that a relatively high 
level of intervention to improve fire safety should be countenanced since lack of 
protection could ultimately result in the total loss of the irreplaceable asset. 
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